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Abstract 
 
Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that interests of labor may well – 
like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. 
Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have 
an interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid excessive risk 
taking and short-run orientated decisions. We compile unique panel data on 
executive compensation over the periods 2006 to 2011 for 405 listed companies and 
use a Hausman-Taylor approach to estimate the effect of codetermination on the 
compensation design. Finally, codetermination has a significantly positive effect on 
performance-based components of compensation, which supports our hypothesis. 
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1 Introduction 
The classical theoretical approach explaining performance-based management compensation 
is the principal agent model that discusses the divergence in interests of a firm’s owner and 
manager. Shareholders are interested in maximizing long-run firm value while managers like 
to maximize their utility, which in turn is determined by compensation, large expense 
accounts, prestige and power. Many of the determinants of managers’ utility are size-related 
and therefore incentives exist to overemphasize growth. Performance-based executive 
compensation contracts are used in such situations as instruments to balance the long-term 
interests between shareholders and managers.  
The analysis may however be incomplete if the influence of workers as important 
stakeholders is neglected. The German two-tier system installs the supervisory board as a 
governance body with the aim of supervising the enforcement of the shareholders’ interests. 
The supervisory boards also have the task of determining management compensation in total 
as well as with respect to the incentive orientation of compensation packages. In the case of 
the German codetermination system supervisory board seats are allocated to employee 
representatives by law. Being member of the supervisory board offers employees the rare 
opportunity to represent their own interests by controlling the managers directly. In this 
respect, the German system of industrial relations offers the opportunity to test what happens 
if workers’ representatives directly exert an influence on executive compensation. 
Incentive-orientated contracts intend to motivate managers more towards profit maximization 
and this in turn could be a matter of cost minimization. In the context of codetermination one 
hypothesis is that employees want to avoid cost minimization strategies, which among other 
items include wage reductions (or low increases) and fast employment adjustments if this is 
necessary in times of crisis. Then codetermination could exert a negative impact on the 
incentive orientation of executive compensation. 
In this study we discuss and test the opposite hypothesis namely that the frequently assumed 
difference in the objective function of shareholders and employees may not exist. On the 
contrary, employees could have an interest in setting incentives for the managers, such that 
the executives make decisions to guarantee the survival of a firm in the long term. For 
example, it is not in the interest of the employees that the top-management pursues overly 
risky expansion projects, implying a considerable overlap between the interests of employees 
and shareholders. The codetermination rights of workers in particular are of relevance, as it is 
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at least questionable whether control exerted by other forces really leads to optimal 
management compensation schemes1.  
Only a limited number of empirical studies exist that consider the effect of German 
codetermination on management compensation, especially on the performance orientation of 
executive compensation. Gorton and Schmid (2004) use a sample of 250 listed companies in 
Germany that traded at the end of the year 1993 and are either quasi-parity codetermined or 
are subject to the weaker one-third codetermination. Due to limited publication obligations in 
Germany at this time the only available information on compensation is the ratio of total 
management board compensation to the number of members. To model pay-performance 
sensitivity the authors interact a performance indicator with a dummy variable indicating 
whether the company is equally represented. By means of the nearest-neighbor method, they 
found out that the link between executive compensation and firm performance at equal-
representation companies is significantly negative. Thus the authors conclude that 
management board compensation provides incentives that are not conducive to pursuing 
shareholders’ interests.  
Edwards et al (2009) use a sample of 1,145 observations on 271 listed companies in Germany 
for the years 1989-1993. The authors investigate the effect of codetermination on pay for 
performance using a fixed-effect approach. Similar to Gorton and Schmid (2004) they use an 
interaction term to model pay-performance sensitivity. However, their results differ from 
Gorton and Schmid’s (2004) as the coefficient of this interaction term is positive in several 
specifications, although never statistically significant due to problems of collinearity2.  
In Germany there have been some recent changes in law concerning publication obligations of 
executive compensation. The so-called VorstOG3 which became effective in 2006 for the first 
time requires the disclosure of detailed German data on different components of 
compensation. Henceforth, German listed corporations are obliged to publish the amount and 
composition of individual board members’ compensation. The compensation is differentiated 
into fixed, short-term performance-based and long-run performance-based parts. This new 
opportunity of access to German data on executive compensation enables empirical research 
with a detailed look on the effect of codetermination on components of compensation in terms 
of fixed versus variable shares.  
1 Cf. for surveys Adams et al (2010), Murphy (2013) and for a quite critical view Bebchek and Freid (2004). 
2 Edwards et al (2009) use return on assets as performance indicator whereas Gorton and Schmid (2004) use the 
ratio of market to book value of equity. Edwards et al (2009) point out that accounting profitability was 
explicitly specified as performance indicators by the Aktiengesetz, such that their performance indicator is more 
suitable. 
3 Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütung 
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Although from an international perspective employee representation by membership on 
supervisory boards is rather special, there are studies from other countries that are related to 
our research question. Outside Germany workers’ interests are mostly represented by unions 
and it is of interest what effect unions have on management compensation. 
Some studies have estimated the direct effect of union presence on the level of executive 
compensation. All studies detected a significant impact of unionization on executive 
compensation but with quite heterogeneous directions4. Nonetheless this literature underlines 
the importance of our research question, namely to what extent labor as a stake- but not 
shareholder is able to influence managerial compensation. 
Below, Section 2 presents the economic and institutional framework of the German board 
model and the impact of codetermination. Section 3 then provides an overview of the data, the 
econometric framework and the empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.  
 
2 The German Board Model and the Impact of Codetermination 
In the past the number of stock companies was rather limited. Since 1997 the number of stock 
and joint- stock companies increased rapidly5. In general, the shareholders do not manage the 
firm themselves. As a result, the classical problem of separation between ownership and 
control (Berle and Means 1932) exists. This separation implies the risk of opportunistic 
behavior, i.e. the management’s ability to manage the company to its own advantage at the 
shareholders’ expense.  
The standard framework describing this divergence of interests is the principle agent theory 
where the shareholder (principle) engages the manager (agent) to perform on his or her behalf 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). In the textbook model the shareholders provide capital, bear the 
risk of investment and receive the profits as a compensation for risk bearing. The managers 
execute the operating business and are closely and effectively monitored by the shareholders.  
Clearly, this model ignores information problems and hardly describes reality in modern stock 
companies. Managers have their own interests and are only imperfectly monitored. As a 
consequence managers might pursue their own utility maximization leading to (overly) risky 
4 Gomez and Tzioumis (2013) present a good overview of existing literature: using U.S. data DiNardo et al 
(1997) find that greater levels of unionization were negatively and significantly associated with CEO cash pay. 
Banning and Chiles (2007) report that in the U.S. union presence, as well as the unionization rate at firm level, 
are negatively related to both the level of total CEO compensation and the proportion of CEO compensation that 
is contingent on firm performance. Based on Canadian data Singh and Agarwal (2002) show that union presence 
is associated with higher CEO cash pay, but not associated with other compensation components (e.g. stock 
options) and total compensation. Gomez and Tzioumis (2013) find evidence that union presence is associated 
with lower levels of total executive compensation in the U.S., especially lower stock option awards. The 
elasticity of cash pay to financial performance is similar across unionized and not unionized firms. (US)  
5 From 4,548 stock and joint-stock companies in 1997 to 14,184 stock and joint-stock companies in 2008 
(Statista) 
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projects, short-run profit maximization and expansion by mergers and acquisitions, which are 
not in the interest of shareowners. The more diversified capital ownership is, the more 
difficult effective execution of control is and the more relevant agency costs become. 
These so-called corporate governance problems have been known about for some time and 
instruments are applied to limit managers’ activities that do not maximize the discounted 
present value of the firm. Such instruments include, for example, institutions that help to 
supervise top managers and incentive-compatible contracts. The working and effectiveness of 
such instruments is the topic of our contribution. 
The internal corporate governance structure for German stock companies differs from the 
Anglo-Saxon one6. The American Board of Directors, for example, manages and supervises 
simultaneously whereas the German two-tier board system separates between a managing and 
a supervising institution, respectively between an executive and a supervisory board.  
Besides operative decision-making the executive board has to call the Annual General 
Meeting and implements its resolutions. Furthermore it has to report to the supervisory board. 
The supervisory board must control the executive board in compliance with the shareholders’ 
interests. This institution has to ensure that the executive board’s decisions are made in 
accordance with the shareholders’ interests. They also decide on the adoption of the financial 
statements and approval of the consolidated financial statements. Another major decision area 
of the supervisory board is the selection, appointment, contract-renewal and dismissal of the 
executive board members. A subcommittee of the supervisory board, the personnel 
committee, decides on total compensation of top management and the composition of 
compensation in terms of fixed versus short- and long-run variable parts7. Hence the 
supervisory board on the one hand exerts control over managers and on the other hand is 
responsible for the implementation of an effective and incentive-compatible compensation 
scheme. 
Given that shareholders and managers are interested in monetary values, incentive-based 
management compensation schemes could align shareholders’ and managers’ interests8. 
Therefore, the management’s compensation design should be divided into a fixed and a 
variable share. The variable share, e.g. bonus payment, profit sharing bonuses or stock 
options, should depend on key values indicating a profit- and value-increasing firm policy. 
6 See for a survey on the role of boards of directors in the U.S. Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010). 
7 In the American corporate governance system the design and level of management compensation is delegated 
to compensation committees. Within these committees mostly outside members of the board of directors 
(directors who are neither current nor former employees) make decisions on executive compensation (Murphy 
(1999)). 
8 Armtrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer and Larcker (2015) conducted a recent empirical study on the effects of 
incentives on managerial behavior. 
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Thus by increasing the variable part of management’s compensation the intention is to reduce 
or even to inhibit the incentives of pursuing opportunistic behavior.  
 
Inefficiency of the supervisory board  
The institutional differentiation into a management and a supervisory board in principle 
improves the task of controlling the top management. Obviously, the effectiveness of 
minimizing agency costs depends on the efficiency of the supervisory board. If the 
shareholders’ interests are not represented adequately by supervisory board members, the risk 
of opportunistic behavior by management remains.  
One major problem of this system is that supervisory boards are not dominated by the 
shareholders themselves, as one might assume in the first place. In fact, in the majority of 
supervisory boards not a single member is a capital owner9. Here we find the very specific 
and at the same time complicated situation where the principals appoint agents who control 
other agents. As the usual principal-agent problem is intensified, it would not be surprising if 
such a system did not work efficiently10.  
Murphy (2013, p. 322) raises general concerns with respect to the role of outside directors in 
the U.S. context: “However, these outside board members – who pay executives with 
shareholder money and not their own – are in no sense perfect agents for the shareholders 
who elected them.” He points out that outside directors often hold only minor quantities of the 
shares and are reluctant to punish badly performing CEOs because they do not benefit much 
from these changes yet bear all of the non-monetary costs.  
Furthermore, Lattemann (2010) mentions that former executive board members (after 
retirement) relatively often become members of supervisory boards of the same company. 
Oehmichen et al. (2014) proved this empirically by showing that in 25% of all observed firm-
years the former executive is currently serving as a supervisory board member within the 
same company. In cases like this it is difficult to regard former CEOs as true outsiders and 
efficient supervisors. They are familiar with most of the current members of the management 
board and also with most other managers. Where top management compensation is to be 
9 Lattemann (2010) refers to this phenomenon in the German governance system and Gralla and Kraft (2011) 
present some empirical evidence. Kahn et al. (2014) suggest distinguishing between share ownership by 
executive directors having responsibility for the day-to-day business and share ownership by non-executive 
directors (one-tier system). The executive’s decisions might be more closely tied to firm performance. There is 
evidence that the share ownership of independent non-executive board members (which could be seen as a 
counterpart to the German supervisory board) is relatively small at 1.9% for an Australian dataset (Kahn et al. 
(2014)) and between 1.92% and 3.09% for an American dataset (Mura (2007)). 
10 Canyon and He (2004) show that the presence of shareholders on the compensation committee of U.S. 
entrepreneurial firms lowers CEO compensation and increases CEO equity incentives. These results support the 
hypothesis that due to intensified agency problems the degree of incentive-orientated compensation schemes 
falls.  
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determined, they might support the view of the executives. Furthermore in cases where 
problems arise due to their own wrong decisions in the past, they will hardly act as neutral 
supervisors. This could lead to a kind of intertemporal self-monitoring. It might violate the 
separation of supervision and management, at least for past decisions. Consequently 
Oehmichen et al. (2014) showed that these former executives have a significant negative 
impact on firm performance.  
In Germany the legal number of supervisory board mandates is limited to a maximum of ten 
seats and some persons actually hold that many supervisory board seats. In such cases the 
supervisory board members simply cannot efficiently execute their control duties due to 
individual time constrains (Aurich (2006)). Existing literature discusses this argument as the 
“busyness hypothesis” saying that directors with multiple appointments are overcommitted 
(Ferris et al. (2003), Fich and Shivdasani (2006))11.  
Inefficiency could also occur due to the fact of interlocked board members, i.e. members of 
the supervisory boards are frequently executives from business partners, including banks12. 
There are usually loyal relations between the members of the management board and those 
members of the supervisory boards who are themselves top managers elsewhere. Networking 
is likely to take place, which might on the one hand have its benefits for members of the 
network, but on the other hand effective control of the executives and efficient design of their 
contracts is questionable13. It is possible that reasonable decisions by the supervisory board 
which in principle would be valuable to the company, but affect the management negatively, 
would then be avoided to secure friendship and the personal network. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) describe gains from the above-mentioned forces of collegiality, 
team spirit and respect for those leading the firm as spillover rents which come largely at the 
expense of shareholders (p 64). Thus, Adams et al. (2010) stress the importance of the 
independence of the board (discussing the U.S. experience) from the CEO to execute adequate 
control and collect information to decide on a possible contract renewal or replacement. As 
11 There is much debate as to what extent the “busyness hypothesis” is true. Some studies argue that a large 
number of board mandates is a sign of quality. For further discussion see Adams et al. (2010) or Andres et al. 
(2013). 
12 There is debate surrounding the efficiency effects of bank representation on German boards. See among others 
Gorton and Schmid (2000) and Edwards and Fischer (1994).  
13 Kramarz and Thesmar (2013) show that networking determines board composition in France, that networked 
CEOs have higher incomes and that networks within the board reduce its efficiency. Battistin, Graziano and 
Parigi (2012) investigate the role of local connections on turnover and performance of Italian banks. Connections 
reduce turnover, attenuate the relation between performance and turnover, and worsen the performance of 
mutual, cooperative and local banks.  
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the authors emphasize, CEOs prefer less independent boards to be less closely monitored and 
to be able to maximize their own utility.14  
Given these potential reasons for inefficiency, it is at least possible that the supervisory board 
members’ motivation to implement efficient performance incentives is limited, which would 
be reflected in a relatively low share of incentive-based executive compensation.15  
 
The impact of codetermination 
Due to the rapid growth of stock companies the classical shareholder value approach has 
gained importance in recent decades. Basically, this approach stipulates maximization of the 
shareholders’ equity. There are two interest groups: shareholders and managers. The 
principals are expected to efficiently determine management compensation in general and its 
components in particular.  
Within this context the German codetermination law (extended in 1976) introduces a third 
interest group, namely the employees. In companies with more than 2000 employees 50% of 
the seats of the supervisory board are legally filled by employee representatives16. This form 
of codetermination has been called “quasi-parity”, as the head of the supervisory board has 
two votes in cases of disputes and the head is appointed by the shareholders. However, 
disputes are rather rare. In the case of firms with between 500 and 2000 employees the weaker 
14 Whereas in America there is a huge amount of literature on the monitor quality of dependent board members 
and its effects on firm performance, there is only little empirical literature for Germany. Recently, Anders et al. 
(2013) used a sample of 133 German firms and found out that firms with intensely connected supervisory boards 
have lower firm performance and a higher level of executive compensation. American empirical evidence mostly 
detects a negative impact of interlocking directorates on (indirect) firm performance. Hallock (1997) examined 
the effect of reciprocally interlocked boards on executive compensation in the US. He states that 8% of CEOs are 
reciprocally interlocked with another CEO and shows that CEOs of interlocked firms earn significantly more. 
Newman and Mozes (1999) examine the efficiency of the compensation committee when insiders are members 
of the compensation committee. Insiders are either employees of the current firm or employees of other firms 
that are well connected with the current firm. With insiders on the board, executive compensation is more 
favorable for the executive, but at the expense of shareholders. In particular they show that pay performance 
sensitivity is less weighted on inferior performance when insiders serve on the compensation committee. 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) show that CEO pay fell by 17% in firms which introduced more independent 
boards in comparison to firms which already had implemented such independent boards. Hwang and Kim (2009) 
find that while 87% of boards are conventionally independent only 62% are conventionally and socially 
independent (without social ties). They detect that firms in the latter group pay a lower level of compensation 
and exhibit stronger pay-performance sensitivity. Faleye (2011) proved empirically that CEOs are paid more and 
their compensation is less sensitive to firm performance when other CEOs serve on their boards.  
15 Sun and Cahan (2009) compute a composite measure of compensation committee quality based on six 
different committee quality characteristics (1. CEO appointed directors, 2. senior directors, 3. CEO directors, 4. 
director shareholdings, 5. additional directorships and 6. committee size). By using a sample of 812 U.S. firms it 
turns out that CEO compensation is more positively associated with accounting performance when firms have 
high compensation committee quality.  
16 Germany is the largest economy in which employees have the legal right to such participation. Denmark, 
Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have similar codetermination laws. Italy and the remaining 
West European countries (with the exception of the UK) implement work councils at the very least. French 
companies send non-voting employees to the board (Smith 1991) 
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one-third codetermination law applies, in which case 33% of the seats of the supervisory 
board go to the labor representatives17. Employees are legally involved in decision-making on 
the supervisory board such that in contrast to what the shareholder value approach proposes, 
the employee’s interests should also be taken into account. The fact that employees get 
control rights raises the question to what extent their interests differ from or are in line with 
those of the shareholders’ ones. The literature discusses this question quite heterogeneously.  
As proponents of the property rights theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) doubt the efficiency 
of codetermination. They argue that if codetermination were beneficial then there would be no 
need for it to be mandatory. This argument supports the hypothesis that codetermination must 
be detrimental to shareholder value because employees’ interests differ from those of the 
shareholders.  
The literature on managerial compensation also considers labor representation as a possible 
cause for a weaker incentive orientation. For example, in their well-known study Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) find a rather weak correlation between performance and managerial 
remuneration. In their view this result might be caused by public and private politically 
orientated forces like unions, which limit the incentive orientation of contracts. The influence 
of such institutions may then partly be responsible for the inefficient design of executive pay.  
Gorton and Schmid (2004) regard the German system of codetermination as one sort of labor 
participation in corporate decision making. Codetermination reduces shareholder wealth 
because the employee representatives might use their influence to “insure” the employees 
against negative shocks. This is realized by resistance against restructuring, layoffs, and wage 
reductions18. Gorton and Schmid (2004) then go one step further and argue that employee 
representatives are in favor of a low share of total compensation being performance-related. 
Then top management would be less orientated towards profit maximization and cost 
minimization.  
In contrast to the property right theory, participation theory (e.g. Freeman and Lazear 1995) 
argues that involving employees in the decision-making process could imply a substantial 
information advantage and therefore have a positive impact on productivity. An important 
17 The employment limit is relevant to the company alone or, if it is a conglomerate or the company has 
subsidiaries, the total number of employees is decisive. The codetermination status of several companies 
deviates from the simple “individual firm employment rule” and it is unclear whether existing empirical studies 
have taken this into account. For quasi-parity codetermination reliable information is available from the Hans-
Böckler Stiftung. Unfortunately, for one-third codetermination no such information is obtainable.  
18 However, in Germany wage negotiations take place between trade unions and employers’ associations. Wages 
differ between firms and there might also be some influence from works councils, but the impact of 
codetermination in the supervisory board on wages is probably rather limited. Slower employment adjustment 
might be an issue, however. Gorton and Schmid (2004) also recognize this point and test several alternative 
hypotheses supporting overemployment but not wage increases. 
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aspect of an employee’s economic value is their years of experience, which is related to 
advanced skills and abilities of special value to the current company (Smith 1991). Thus 
employees invest in specific human capital which is only productive in the present 
employment relationship. On the one hand, labor representatives on the supervisory boards 
may execute the voice option in the sense of the Freeman and Medoff (1984) exit-voice 
theory and by this reduce quits. On the other hand, worker representatives may safeguard the 
increased investment in firm-specific human capital by adequate decisions on strategic 
decisions including managerial incentives. Witt (2002) points out that especially with respect 
to dismissals and bankruptcy the long-term interests of shareholders and employees may well 
be similar.  
In this connection Edwards et al. (2009) argue that employees may be good monitors of 
managerial performance because of their close knowledge of the firm’s operations. Similarly 
Fauver and Fuerst (2006) point out that labor representatives on supervisory boards are highly 
informed monitors who reduce managerial agency costs as well as private benefits of 
blockholder control. They stress that unlike other members of the supervisory board the 
representatives of the workers have detailed information on the daily operations and processes 
taking place at the firm. They acquire knowledge on the feasibility of projects in practice and 
on the problems as well as advantages associated with new technologies.  
We argued earlier that the German board system might suffer from inefficiency due to 
structural and agency problems. Consequently, the interests of the shareholders will probably 
not be represented adequately on the supervisory board. The representatives of the workers on 
the board may well be more independent in the sense of Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2010) and might therefore control CEOs more carefully than the representatives of the capital 
owners. Perhaps surprisingly, here the representation of the employees on the supervisory 
board may serve as a substitute for the underrepresented or unrepresented interests of the 
shareholders. This might be true if the employees have similar interests to the shareholders in 
the long-run survival of the firm. If so, the employees’ representatives will try to limit short-
run optimization, the pursuit of overly risky projects and excessively costly expansion policies 
e.g. by merger or acquisition. As a consequence, codetermination may have a positive impact 
on executive compensation in terms of a stronger link between compensation and 
performance.  
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3 Empirical study 
The following empirical study analyses the impact of codetermination on management 
compensation. We want to examine empirically whether the assumed difference in the 
objective function of shareholders and employees really exists. In order to do so we will 
analyze the link between codetermination and management compensation. 
Our general research strategy is the investigation of the ratio of variable to total 
compensation. In contrast to fixed compensation the variable share of compensation actually 
depends on short-term and long-term firm performance. Thus, the share of variable 
compensation indicates the incentive orientation of managerial remuneration.  
 
3.1 Data  
Our dataset is composed of four different sources. As mentioned earlier, detailed data on 
executive compensation has been available for some years. Kienbaum Consulting collects 
data on different components of executive compensation and provided us with this 
information on large German corporations. Covering the years 2006 to 2011, this dataset 
contains, besides total average executive compensation per head, detailed information on 
fixed compensation and performance-based compensation. The variable part of the 
remuneration is differentiated into short-term and long-term incentive orientated payments.  
We combine the Kienbaum dataset with the database “dafne” provided by Bureau van Dijk, 
which contains companies’ information on economic variables, which in turn potentially 
explain the components of managers’ compensation. This dataset contains among other items 
comprehensive information on companies’ financial performance and employment. The 
information on quasi-parity codetermined companies was provided by the Hans Böckler 
Foundation. Eventually, a unique unbalanced panel is assembled, consisting of 405 German 
stock-listed firms covering the periods 2006 to 2011 with 1713 observations overall.  
 
Table 1 below lists definitions of the variables used and presents descriptive statistics for the 
whole sample. RVarTotComp describes the ratio of variable to total executive compensation, 
whereas the variable part is defined as the sum of short-term variable and long-term variable 
parts. The number of executive board members is represented by EBoardMembers. We 
control for accounting profitability by using current and lagged information on returns on 
equity in percent (ROE and LagROE, respectively) as performance indicator. The size of a 
company is represented by the number of employees. On average we observe companies with 
more than 13,000 employees. The dummy DProfit assumes unit value if the balance sheet 
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total is positive and zero otherwise. In our sample 77 percent of the companies in this sample 
have a positive balance sheet total. The variable intDProfitROE represents an interaction 
between DProfit and ROE. Unsurprisingly the mean value of returns on equity of those 
companies with a positive balance sheet total is, at 9.65 percent, higher than the mean value of 
all companies in the current period (3.79 percent). DCodet serves as a dummy variable which 
takes the value one if it is an equal-representation company and zero otherwise. Around one 
quarter of our sample is represented by parity codetermined companies.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for 2006-2011 (mean values and standard deviations) 
 Mean Se  
RVarTotComp 0.3829  0.2270 
EBoardMembers  3.0817 1.3902 
LagROE 4.1481 30.0599 
ROE 3.7906 23.5895 
Employ 13260.59 48356.96 
DProfit 0.7729 0.4191 
intDProfitROE 9.6521 9.7493 
DCodet 0.2402 0.4296 
Number of Observations 1713  
 
Figure 1 shows the composition of executive compensation over the years for German 
companies without and with codetermination in terms of quasi-parity representation. 
Obviously, the compensation structure of companies with parity representation differs 
strongly from companies without parity representation. The mean value of the variable share 
of total compensation over the whole period is 31 percent for non-codetermined companies 
and 52 percent for codetermined companies. Thus, from a descriptive point of view, 
codetermined companies use a higher share of short-term as well as long-term performance-
based compensation. These descriptive statistics give reason to hypothesize that codetermined 
companies determine executive compensation in a more incentive-based way than others. In 
the next step we check whether this presumption holds in a causal context by means of 
regression analysis.  
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Figure 1: Composition of Executive Compensation 
 
 
 
3.2 Econometric Framework  
If there is no unobserved heterogeneity, random effects estimators provide a consistent and 
efficient estimator. Obviously our research context has to deal with the problem of 
unobservable company-specific effects on executive compensation which might cause a 
specification bias. As a matter of principle, former studies used either a fixed effect or a 
random effects approach to get rid of the bias caused by unobserved company-specific effects.  
In this study the Hausman Test rejects the hypothesis of no correlation between fixed effects 
and the regressors. The use of a random effects model makes therefore at most a first step but 
a fixed effects model seems to be more appropriate. Indeed a fixed effects model allows 
controlling for systematic unobservable effects by eliminating the company-specific effect 
through use of deviations from means or first differences19. However, besides the advantage 
of eliminating unobserved effects, a severe disadvantage of the fixed effects estimator is the 
elimination of time-invariant variables. Given that we are interested in the effect of 
19 Examples for such firm-specific influences include difficulties in monitoring executives efficiently, which 
induce a stronger incentive orientation of executive compensation. In contrast, firms which are exposed to high 
exogenous risk reduce the variable component of remuneration (Kraft and Niederprüm 1999). However, Peters 
and Wagner (2014) show that in the presence of high dismissal risk total compensation is higher. 
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codetermination on compensation, which will be represented by a time-invariant dummy 
variable, the fixed effects method no longer serves as a suitable method.  
Hausman and Taylor (1981) propose an estimator to deal with this problem using an 
instrumental variable method. The major advantage of the Hausman-Taylor estimator is that it 
permits estimation of the impact of time-invariant variables in a panel data setting while 
solving potential endogeneity problems. Hausman and Taylor (1981) consider the following 
panel model: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1+𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽2 + 𝑍𝑍1𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾1 + 𝑍𝑍2𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
with 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 representing the individual fixed effects and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 representing the error term. All 
regressors are assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. There are four groups of explanatory 
variables: 
𝑋𝑋1: time-variant variables, which are not correlated with 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
𝑋𝑋2: time-variant variables, which are correlated with 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
𝑍𝑍1: time-invariant variables, which are not correlated with 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
𝑍𝑍2: time-invariant variables, which are correlated with 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
The main idea is to instrument the time-varying endogenous variables (𝑋𝑋2) as well as time-
invariant endogenous variables (𝑍𝑍2). 𝑋𝑋2 variables are instrumented by their deviations from 
group means. The instrumental variables for 𝑍𝑍1 are the variables themselves. The critical 
time-invariant endogenous variables 𝑍𝑍2 are finally instrumented by means of the 𝑋𝑋1 variables, 
as these variables are independent of the individual fixed effects. So the Hausman-Taylor 
approach uses the time averages of those time-varying regressors that are uncorrelated with 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
as instruments for the time-invariant regressors. Consequently this method requires that the 
number of time-variant exogenous variables is at least as large as the number of time-
invariant endogenous variables. To test whether the set of instruments 𝑋𝑋1 is legitimate one can 
use a Hausman test based on the difference between Hausman-Taylor and the within estimator 
(Baltagi (2013) Verbeek (2012), Wooldridge (2010)). 
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3.3 Results 
Table 2 illustrates the results of a simple random effects estimation (1) and two Hausman-
Taylor estimations ((2) and (3)). The dependent variable is the ratio of variable to total 
compensation.  
Whereas in the random effects approach all explanatory variables are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the firm-specific effect 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, the Hausman-Taylor approach differentiates 
between endogenous and exogenous variables. Therefore we grouped the variables 
EBoardMember, time dummies and interactions between the returns on equity and industry 
dummies (WZ200820-first stage) as 𝑋𝑋1 variables. As 𝑋𝑋2 variables we set ROE, LagROE, the 
log of employment21 (lnEmploy), DProfit, intDProfitROE and industry dummies (WZ2008 
two-digit)22. 
The exogeneity assumptions are not rejected using a Hausman test based on the difference 
between Hausman-Taylor and within estimator. Therefore for both Hausman-Taylor models 
we cannot rule out that the set of instruments chosen are legitimate.  
The crucial difference between model (2) and model (3) is the assumption on the dummy 
variable DCodet in this Hausman-Taylor context. DCodet is assumed to be exogenous (𝑍𝑍1) in 
model (2) and endogenous (𝑍𝑍2) in model (3). 
  
It turns out that in all three models and in contrast to previous studies the effect of parity 
employee representation has a positive effect on the variable share of executive compensation. 
If it is controlled for potential correlation between being codetermined and the individual 
firm-specific fixed effect using internal instruments, the impact increases and turns out to be 
significantly positive, even in the Hausman-Taylor context. In general the fixed effects have 
some relation to explanatory variables23 and here the impact of codetermination on the 
variable share of executive compensation is affected by firm specific effects as well. Ignoring 
this correlation may lead to biased results.  
Summarizing, codetermined companies apply a significantly higher share of variable 
compensation than companies which are not codetermined. The econometric results are in 
accordance with the earlier presumptions which were based on Figure 1. In codetermined 
20 „Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige“ of Statistisches Bundesamt 
21 We use the log of Employ as a more flexible way to estimate the relation between firm size and the dependent 
variable. 
22Time dummies and interaction between ROE and WZ2008 first stage and WZ2008 two-digit are however 
omitted from Table 2. 
23 Hausman test between within estimation and random effects rejects the null hypothesis. Thus there is a 
systematic difference in coefficients between within and random effects.  
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companies the variable share of executive compensation is on average 26 percentage points 
higher than in other companies.  
Besides the positive impact of codetermination, the remaining controls provide further 
findings of major importance. The significant positive coefficient of lnEmploy indicates that 
the larger the company, the higher the variable share of compensation.  
The impact of accounting performance indicators (ROE, LagROE) has to be considered in a 
more differentiated way. On average, once lagged returns on equity show no significant 
impact on the composition of management compensation. Therefore it seems that bad 
performance in the past does not influence future compensation design. However, an increase 
in current returns on equity by one percentage point increases the variable share of 
management compensation significantly by 0.3 percentage points. Thus the composition of 
management compensation significantly depends on accounting performance. By restricting 
the impact of returns on equity on companies with a positive balance sheet total (represented 
by intDProfitROE) the impact turns out to be significantly positive. Thus the degree of pay-
performance sensitivity increases for companies with positive accounting performances in 
comparison to companies with negative accounting performances.  
A similar interpretation holds regarding the coefficient of DProfit. In general companies with 
good economic circumstances pay a 6.7 percentage point higher share of variable 
compensation than companies experiencing bad economic situations. 
Obviously there seems to be a considerable asymmetry in punishing managers for bad firm 
decisions (resulting in a negative balance sheet total) and remunerating managers for good 
firm decisions (resulting in a positive balance sheet total). 
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Table 2: Random Effects and Hausman-Taylor Estimation Results 
 Random Effects  Hausman-Taylor 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
 RVarTotComp  RVarTotComp RVarTotComp 
  TVexogenous:   
EBoardMembers -0.0019 
(-0.32) 
 -0.0038 
(-0.54) 
-0.0107 
(-1.39) 
  TVendogenous:   
LagROE 0.0001 
(0.62) 
 -0.000 
(-0.08) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
     
ROE 0.0027 
(0.99) 
 0.0032*** 
(3.58) 
0.0031*** 
(3.48) 
     
lnEmploy 0.0491*** 
(8.08) 
 0.0499*** 
(3.51) 
0.0300* 
(1.68) 
     
DProfit 0.0588*** 
(4.32) 
 0.0688*** 
(4.63) 
0.0681*** 
(4.59) 
     
intDProfitROE 0.0040*** 
(5.77) 
 0.0032*** 
(4.00) 
0.0032*** 
(3.93) 
  TIexogenous:   
DCodet 0.0549** 
(2.19) 
 0.0544 
(1.26)  
  TIendogenous:   
DCodet   
 
0.2636** 
(2.49) 
     
_cons -0.0872 
(-0.66) 
 -0.9843 
(-1.07) 
-1.0569 
(-1.00) 
𝜒𝜒2 (p-value) Hausman 
test on Hausman-
Taylor vs. within 
estimation of all time-
variant variables 
- 
 
15.01 (0.7759) 9.01 (0.9734) 
N 1713  1713 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; TV refers to time varying; TI refers 
to time-invariant. All variables are deflated by cpi. Coefficients of industry dummies (WZ2008 2-digit) are not reported (TI 
exogenous). Coefficients of interaction between industry dummies (WZ2008 first stage) and ROE are not reported (TV 
exogenous). Time dummies are not reported (TV exogenous). The reported chi value refers to a Hausman test without robust 
standard errors due to restrictions of the statistic software. 
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4 Conclusion 
A particularity of the German corporate governance system is that management and 
supervision are executed by two different institutions. In the two-tier board system the 
executive board manages the company whereas the supervisory board supervises the 
enforcement of the shareholders’ interests. According to codetermination law 50% of the seats 
of the supervisory board must be filled by employee representatives. One explicit task of the 
supervisory board is to define the management’s compensation. In order to avoid excessive 
risk taking and short-term optimization behavior by managers the supervisory board should 
ensure for an incentive-based executive compensation. This study aims at investigating the 
impact of labor as a stakeholder without capital shares on the incentive orientation of 
executive compensation. 
The study investigates the effect of codetermination on the variable share of total 
compensation. In many cases capital shares are highly diversified and it is by no means 
guaranteed that the interests of the capital owners will be efficiently executed by the 
supervisory boards. One indication for this presumption is the low representation of capital 
owners on the supervisory boards. However employees’ interests are in many cases well 
represented by works councils and these are usually members of the supervisory boards of 
codetermined companies. Thus, unlike supervisory board members, who represent the capital 
owners, employee representatives probably use their control function more efficiently.  
In contrast to previous literature we argue that employees may well to a large extent have 
similar interests to the shareholders. In order to avoid short-term profit maximization and 
undue risky decisions by top management, employees quite probably support performance-
based compensation schemes.  
The estimates of this study show that the variable share of executive compensation in 
codetermined companies is on average 26 percentage points higher than in non-codetermined 
companies. The stronger orientation towards incentive-based compensation in codetermined 
companies supports our hypothesis that, similarly to shareholders, employees pursue a policy 
that aims at securing the long-term survival of their firm. Perhaps surprisingly, the interests of 
capital and labor are not necessarily opposed. In a situation with rather weak representation of 
shareholder interests, worker representatives may even help to realize efficient management 
incentives.  
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